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Abstract
Features such as elasticity, scalability, universal access, low entry cost, and flexible billing motivate consumers to
migrate their core businesses to the cloud. However, in doing so there are challenges about security, privacy, and
compliance. Businesses are pressured to comply with regulations depending on their service types; for example, in
the US government agencies are required to comply with FISMA, healthcare organizations are required to comply
with HIPAA; public retail companies must to comply with SOX and PCI. We survey work on compliance issues and
we conclude that the lack of reference architectures and relevant patterns makes compliance harder than it should
be. We also explore current industrial trends of compliance approaches. We end by summarizing compliance issues
and give some guidelines about what this architecture and its corresponding patterns should contain.
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1 Introduction
In the last few years, the use of cloud services has be-
come widespread. According to International Data Cor-
poration (IDC) [37], public spending on cloud services is
estimated to reach $107 billion by the year 2017. A large
number of cloud service providers (CSP), service bro-
kers, and customers are increasingly taking advantage of
cloud features such as elasticity, scalability, universal ac-
cess, low entry cost, flexible billing, easy metering, and
convenient monitoring. Despite the increase in demand
and popularity, there are major challenges in moving a
business to the cloud, such as compliance, security, and
privacy. There are many works considering security and
privacy in clouds but we are concerned here only with
compliance aspects, which have strong relation to those
attributes; in fact, there are relatively few works dealing
mostly with compliance aspects.
Regulations are sets of policies that govern the use of
sensitive business data. The main intent of these regula-
tions are to protect consumers’ privacy and provide se-
curity by enforcing attributes such as confidentiality,
integrity, availability, and accountability (CIAA). Compli-
ance implies enforcing the rules that implement the pol-
icies defined in the regulations. In the opinion of [41],
legal compliance may become the most important Non-
Functional Requirement (NFR) for a large number of
software systems. Government and state regulations are
mandatory while industry regulations are suggestions.
Regulations vary from country to country but in many
cases they use almost identical policies customized to
their local needs. We consider here only US regulations
but most of our conclusions apply to non-US regula-
tions. Because of the very nature of cloud technology,
compliance is a shared responsibility among organiza-
tions and service providers; it involves service providers,
service brokers, customers, and auditors. According to
the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) [48], organizations are fully responsible for all
compliance-related issues. The cost of not being compli-
ant may result in penalty fees, lawsuits, and bad business
reputation.
Regulations are often verbose, lengthy, hard to read,
redundant, ambiguous, and in some cases even incon-
sistent. They are indeed documents intended for lawyers
not for software developers. We examined in detail only
a relatively small number of regulations but the opinion
of several authors and people we talked to is similar, e.g.
[7, 28, 41]. On the other hand, service providers and
consumers are expected to be 100 % compliant and they
are often required to comply with more than one regula-
tion. There is a need then for tools to assist enterprises
* Correspondence: dyimam@fau.edu
Department of Computer and Electrical Engineering and Computer Science,
Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, FL, USA
Journal of Internet Services
and Applications
© 2016 Yimam and Fernandez. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Yimam and Fernandez Journal of Internet Services and Applications  (2016) 7:5 
DOI 10.1186/s13174-016-0046-8
or software houses when implementing software systems
that must be compliant, but we have found that the lack
of a vendor-neutral standard compliance Reference
Architecture (RA) is a basic challenge for service pro-
viders, service brokers, consumers, and auditors. An RA
is a standardized, generic software architecture, with no
platform dependencies, valid for a particular domain [4].
An RA can be used to guide system design and develop-
ment; it can also be a reference to indicate where the
specific compliance policies should be applied in the sys-
tem architecture. An RA can serve as a common lan-
guage among stakeholders including business owners,
managers, architects, developers, testers, and auditors.
References [9, 34, 35, 49, 51, 61] describe RAs intended
to guide compliance. There is no accepted definition
about what an RA should contain; the available compli-
ance RAs are either vendor specific, lack standard mod-
eling, or are incomplete. In addition, the style and the
depth of the architectures are different among vendors.
As a result, consumers are challenged to evaluate service
providers with no standard compliance RAs that could
be used as a common reference and checklist. In par-
ticular, when negotiating service contracts it is hard for
both consumers and providers to define precisely what it
means to be compliant with some regulation. One of the
objectives of this paper is to indicate what aspects
should be included in such an RA. Some of the regula-
tions have been described by patterns and we indicate
also how a catalog of compliance patterns can help to
build a compliance RA. We do not provide here an ideal
architecture or discuss how to build one, but we have
done that in [64].
Often, compliance and security are only addressed ei-
ther at the testing phase or at the last stage of develop-
ment, which could potentially result in applications that
do not identify potential threats. In order to build good
quality and compliant systems, it is critical to consider
the enforcement of regulations at all development
phases including requirements, design, implementation,
and testing phases. An RA emphasizes the need to start
from a conceptual view of the semantics of the regula-
tions without getting prematurely involved into imple-
mentation details. In [22] we showed the value of an RA
as a way to enumerate threats and indicate where coun-
termeasures should be placed. Since compliance is
strongly based on security measures and related policies,
it is clear that an accepted RA describing specific regula-
tions would provide a way to facilitate building systems
that comply with the corresponding regulations. We will
consider the use or lack of RAs as a criteria to judge the
publications we analyze in our survey. RAs can be built
using patterns and use of patterns is another way to
make explicit compliance with policies. A pattern is a
solution to a recurring problem in a specific context,
typically expressed using UML (Unified Modeling Lan-
guage) models [8].
An RA would be a great help to build new regulations
by identifying commonalities. Identifying overlaps and
patterns among regulations can avoid duplicate imple-
mentations and inconsistencies as well as allow consid-
ering known security threats [23]. Reference [28]
identified 31 technical security features that are common
for FISMA [24], HIPAA [33], PCI [52] and ISO [39].
They concluded that implementing compliance guide-
lines for FISMA could cover compliance for HIPAA,
PCI and ISO with the exception of privacy. Reference
[30] built a citation graph to analyze interrelated regula-
tions, overlaps, and possible conflicts. Reference [45]
identified overlaps among GLBA, HIPAA, PCI DSS, and
SOX regulations. These commonalities are important in
complying with multiple regulations and for understand-
ing regulations in general.
Most businesses use independent third party certifying
agencies [15] and internal IT auditors to assure compli-
ance, security, and privacy. In addition, government
agencies in the US that support cloud computing must
fulfill the Federal Risk and Authorization Management
Program (FedRAMP) [16]. The US government pub-
lished the list of FedRAMP certified cloud service pro-
viders [15] and Third Party Assessment Organizations
(3PAOs) [17] that can be used as a reference for any
cloud service providers and consumers. Service pro-
viders such as Amazon, IBM, Microsoft, Oracle, HP and
others claim compliance by certifying their cloud ser-
vices with 3PAOs. We survey here some industrial com-
pliance efforts. Based on the survey of publications and
industrial practice we discuss their significant issues and
provide guidance about how this architecture should be.
Section 2 describes some background about regula-
tions, patterns, and RAs. We survey compliance publica-
tions in Section 3 and compliance approaches in
industry in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes compliance
issues and recommendations. We end with some conclu-
sions and future research directions in section 6.
2 Background
In this section we describe some background about reg-
ulations, standards, patterns, and RAs.
2.1 Regulations and standards
We summarize below some of the common regulations
in the U.S.
HIPAA (Federal regulation): Healthcare organizations
are required to comply with the Healthcare Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [33]. The
main objective of HIPAA is to ensure the security and
privacy of Protected Health Information (PHI). PHI in-
cludes patient medical records, personal information,
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credit information, insurance, employment information,
and any related information that helps to identify an in-
dividual. HIPAA categorizes participating entities as cov-
ered entities and business associates. Covered entities
include health care providers, health insurers, and health
care clearinghouses (i.e. entities that manage billing ser-
vices and process medical records that come from other
systems). Business associates are entities that transfer,
store, and service protected health information on behalf
of covered entities. HIPAA has five major rules [33]:
 Privacy rule: health providers must notify individuals
of the use of their health information. In addition,
health providers must regulate the use and
disclosure of PHI.
 Security rule: regulates the security of PHI from
breaches, unauthorized access, deletion, and
modification held by covered entities and business
associates. This rule complements the Privacy rule
by defining ways to protect its information.
 Transaction and Code Sets rule: Regulates medical
transactions, medical coding standards, and
reporting.
 Enforcement rule: it sets money penalties for
violating HIPAA rules and establishes procedures
for investigations and hearings for HIPAA violations.
It regulates the use and disclosure of Protected
Health Information for law enforcement officials.
 Unique identifier rule: prescribes that employers and
participating parties are required to have unique
Employer Identification Numbers (EIN) to use for
their transactions. Each medical transaction is
required to have a unique ID and code set.
PCI-DSS (Credit Card industry regulation): Companies
that handle cardholder information are required to com-
ply with the Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standard (PCI DSS) [52]. Cardholder information in-
cludes debit, credit, prepaid, ATM, and Point of Sale
(POS) cards. PCI recommends that only authorized
users have access to manage cardholder data. PCI has
twelve major rules to protect cardholder data including
installation of firewalls, resetting default password and
security parameters, authentication, authorization, en-
cryption, and others. Its rules are as follows [52]:
 Install and maintain a firewall configuration to
protect cardholder data
 Do not use default passwords or security parameters
 Protect stored cardholder data
 Encrypt transmission of sensitive information across
public networks
 Use and regularly update anti-virus and malware
protection
 Develop and maintain secure systems and
applications
 Restrict access to data by using a need-to-know
policy
 Identify and authenticate access to system
components
 Restrict physical access to cardholder data
 Track and monitor access to network and
cardholder data
 Regularly test security systems and processes
 Maintain an information security policy
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (Federal regulation): SOX
establishes standards for all US publicly-traded compan-
ies to protect shareholders and the general public from
accounting errors and fraudulent practices [57]. SOX en-
forces control on user management, auditing, reporting,
security and privacy analysis, authorization, authentica-
tion, system development, program and infrastructure
management, monitoring, backup, and disaster recovery.
Its rules are as follows [57]:
 Establish safeguards against fraudulent financial
report, including data accuracy and correction
timeline.
 Disclose compliance and security safeguards to
independent auditors, including security policies,
changes, application and system logs, and
operations.
 Establish safeguards to prevent unauthorized data
tampering
 Establish safeguards to track data access and
changes
 Regularly test security systems, policies, and
processes
 Maintain an information security policy
 Detect and notify security breaches
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) (Federal regulation):
It requires institutions that offer financial products or
services to consumers to develop, implement, and main-
tain a comprehensive information security program that
protects the confidentiality and integrity of customer re-
cords [29]. Its rules include:
 Privacy rule - disclosure policies and procedures on
how consumer’s data is protected and used.
 Safeguard rule – maintain comprehensive security
policies. Security policies need to be applied to all
with no exception and need to be reviewed, tested,
and maintained frequently.
Control Objectives for Information and Related
Technology (COBIT), (IT industry regulation): It is a
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standard to provide IT governance and control. It at-
tempts to ensure the integrity of information and infor-
mation systems by providing technical guidelines on
information security, compliance, governance, audit, and
risk management [11].
The Federal Information Security and Management
Act (FISMA), (Federal government regulation): FISMA
applies to government agencies and affiliated companies
that collect and process data on behalf of government
agencies [24]. It provides guidelines on security controls,
user access, identity management, risk assessment,
auditing, and monitoring.
ISO/IEC 27000 (IT industry regulation): It is a general
security guideline for all types of organization including
commercial enterprises of all sizes [39]. It is a family of
standards that helps organizations to secure information
assets. Some of its standards are:
ISO/IEC 27001 –Information security management
systems requirements
ISO/IEC 27002 – Code of practice for information
security controls
ISO/IEC 27003 – Information security management
system implementation guidance
ISO/IEC 27004 - Security techniques – Information
security management
ISO/IEC 27002 defines six access control objectives
that cover end user, privileged user, network, application,
and information. The objectives include control access
to information, manage user access rights, apply good
access practices, control access to network services, con-
trol access to operating systems, and control access to
applications and systems [42].
These regulations and standards are used in service
sectors such as healthcare, finance, retail, communica-
tion, energy, education, and government agencies.
Table 1 shows a summary of a few service sectors with
their corresponding regulations. In most cases, service
sectors support multiple regulations to comply with gov-
ernment and industry regulations. As mentioned earlier,
many countries have similar regulations and standards
customized to their local needs. For example, the Euro-
pean Union Data Protection Directive law (EU DPD) has
a set of policies to protect the confidentiality, integrity,
availability, and accountability of personal data [44]. EU
countries are required to comply with these policies.
2.2 Patterns
A pattern encapsulates a solution to a recurring problem
in a specific context. Patterns can be used to analyze
complex systems, to capture design decisions, assump-
tions, and experiences. They can improve software qual-
ity by promoting reusability, scalability, and consistency.
Patterns can be categorized as analysis patterns [19, 25],
design and architecture patterns [8, 26], and security
patterns [18, 20]. Pattern solutions are usually repre-
sented using modeling languages such as the Unified
Modeling Language (UML), maybe combined with for-
mal languages such as the Object Constraint Language
(OCL) [63]. Patterns may include class diagrams, se-
quence diagrams corresponding to use cases, and state
diagrams, and they are described using templates. A few
patterns exist to describe the architectural implications
of regulation policies [14, 21].
2.3 Reference Architectures (RAs)
As defined earlier, a Reference Architecture (RA) is a
generic abstract architecture, valid for a particular do-
main (or set of domains), with no implementation as-
pects or vendor specific details [4, 60]. RAs are special
types of architectures intended to understand, analyze,
design and standardize complex systems at a high level
of abstraction. RAs are reusable, extendable, and config-
urable; that is, they are kinds of patterns for whole archi-
tectures and can be instantiated into specific software
architectures by adding platform aspects. Software archi-
tectures derived from RAs could mitigate risks, facilitate
compliance, and protect confidentiality and integrity of
consumers’ data [10, 62]). RAs can become a common
language among stakeholders including business owners,
managers, architects, developers, testers and auditors.
RAs can also be used to standardize application design,
implementation, and verification. RAs can be built of
patterns and there is also a possibility of identifying new
patterns while building them. In addition, block dia-
grams, reference models, viewpoints, use cases, and for-
mal languages can be used to build RAs.
3 Survey of compliance in cloud computing
There are only a few papers that have direct relationship
to our survey. We review papers that discuss general as-
pects of regulations or which consider compliance with
specific regulations.
Reference [48] identified a number privacy and secur-
ity related issues that could have an impact on cloud
computing. The paper covers issues and recommenda-
tions on governance, compliance, trust, architecture,
identity, access management, software isolation, data
Table 1 Summary of service sectors with their corresponding
regulations
Service sector Regulation
1 Healthcare HIPAA, PCI
2 Retail PCI, SOX
3 Financial PCI, SOX, and GLBA
4 Government agencies FISMA
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protection, availability, and incident report. The paper
pointed out that compliance in cloud computing is one
of the complex issues to deal with as policies vary from
country to country. As per [48], understanding and en-
forcing regulations are also a major challenge in cloud
computing. They analyzed the impact of data location,
loss of control, and transparency in public cloud compli-
ance. The issue of electronic discovery that involves
identification, collection, processing, analysis, and pro-
duction of stored information is also covered. The au-
thors didn’t cover techniques to map complex policies
into best practices, patterns, or RAs. They also men-
tioned that most cloud service providers use third party
certification to confirm their compliance. As per our
survey, third party auditors are using proprietary solu-
tions that lack vendor neutral models or architectures
that can be used as a checklist by all stakeholders.
Reference [45] compared GLBA, HIPAA, PCI and
SOX standards on the basis of generating reports for au-
ditors. Their findings showed that some reports and ser-
vices share common features including user logon
report, user logoff report, user failure report and logs ac-
cess report as shown in Table 2. They concluded that
SOX compliance with respect to reports also covers the
required reports for GLBA, HIPAA and PCI-DSS. The
authors didn’t cover other features of compliance such
as privacy, security, user management, and notification.
The comparison table would have been more precise if
it was backed by more precise artifacts.
Reference [55] analyzed the top seven threats and their
possible impact on cloud compliance by mapping threats
to applicable regulations. The mapping could be used as
a reference to evaluate compliance. However, the paper
lacks explicit mappings between compliance and security
threats. For example, in Table 3 threats # 2 and #3 are
not mapped to any compliance standard. The paper also
lacks a precise definition of threats and their corre-
sponding correlation with compliance. For example, they
consider threats #2 and #3 as threats but they are vul-
nerabilities. The authors left out other regulations such
as SOX and GLBA and did not try to define an RA.
Note also that this list of threats is rather incomplete;
for a more comprehensive list see [31, 55].
Reference [54] reviewed privacy regulations in the
cloud. They pointed out that there are still many uncer-
tainties with respect to compliance and privacy in cloud
computing. As a result, it is becoming very difficult to
analyze security, privacy and compliance among cloud
service providers. In addition, they indicated that many
regulations share common requirements such as privacy,
integrity, security and enforcement. They mentioned
that organizations are liable in the case of security
breaches and lawsuits. They also reviewed the use of in-
dependent third parties to certify compliance.
Reference [46] analyzed HIPAA and COBIT with re-
spect to NIST guidelines. According to [46], healthcare
organizations that adopt COBIT as their standard will
immediately satisfy 50 % of the NIST standards. They
concluded that an increase in security threats, complex
regulations, lack of qualified security experts, and high
implementation and maintenance costs are the most
common challenges in the healthcare industry. In
addition, the authors pointed out that company compli-
ance can be improved by analyzing regulation overlaps
and best practices. The overlap was presented in block
diagrams which do not show clearly the type and the na-
ture of these overlaps.
Reference [30] built a citation graph that could be used
by analysts to navigate through the various interrelated
regulations to uncover overlaps and possible conflicts or
Table 2 GLBA, HIPAA, PCI DSS and SOX report comparison [45]
Reports GLBA HIPAA PCI-DSS SOX
User logon / Logoff ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Logon failure ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Audit logs access ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Object access ✓ ✓ ✓
System events ✓ ✓
Host session status ✓ ✓
Security log archiving ✓ ✓ ✓
Track account management and use group changes ✓
Track audit policy changes ✓ ✓
Successful user account validation ✓ ✓
Unsuccessful use account validation ✓ ✓
Track individual user actions report ✓ ✓
Track application access ✓
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to understand compliance documents. The authors used
a decision support system to identify compliance similar-
ities and differences. They used this citation graph to
understand regulations, to uncover overlaps and possible
conflicts. They also use the citation graph to detect im-
portant provisions by ranking, to assess the impact of
change in a particular act, and to validate consistency.
The overlaps include security, notification, reporting,
and user management. The authors focused only on
HIPAA, SOX and GLBA regulations. We can also assert
that [45] findings confirm [30] conclusions.
Reference [6] developed a compliant cloud computing
(C3) framework to address security, compliance, privacy,
and trust issues. According to the authors, C3 can be
used to address data privacy by enforcing data storage in
specific regions and by applying data fragmentation.
They claim that the framework can be used as a broker
to integrate multiple service providers. The authors pro-
posed a domain specific language (DSL), a metamodel
and an activity diagram to analyze regulations such as
HIPAA, PCI and SOX.
Reference [13] developed a framework called MEGH-
NAD [13] that uses a Multi-Objective Genetic Algo-
rithm (MOGA) to determine an optimal security toolset
that could meet security and compliance requirements.
The authors claim that the framework can be used to
generate compliance checklists and Service Level Agree-
ments (SLAs). They also used the framework to analyze
security levels and cloud assurance levels for IaaS, PaaS
and SaaS.
According to [12], security and compliance tools could
help organizations to certify compliance. They reviewed
compliance tools such as WatchGuard and Trust Wave
to analyze, and generate compliance coverage reports.
The depth and scope of the reports vary from vendor to
vendor. The authors categorized service models and
defined a compliance mapping matrix based on “who
controls what” as shown in Tables 4 and 5. The defini-
tions in these tables are not detailed enough to show
precisely the roles of the users of a cloud. For example,
access control is a shared responsibility but it is indi-
cated as vendor responsibility in Table 4. In Table 4, re-
quirements 3 and 5 are the same by definition; however,
the authors provide different roles for IaaS responsibility.
They covered HIPAA and PCI standards but these con-
clusions may not apply to other standards. The authors
suggested that more research needs to be done in order
to build consumers’ confidence and trust.
Reference [47] discussed PCI compliance challenges
and solutions. The authors reviewed challenges such as
costs, overlaps, legal uncertainties, security, mainten-
ance, complexity, code quality, and new technologies.
Their proposed solutions are based on best practices.
The solutions include authentication, authorization, en-
cryption, and monitoring. The authors didn’t cover how
to address regulation complexities and overlaps.
Reference [28] analyzed security overlaps among
FISMA, HIPAA, PCI and ISO. The author identified 31
technical security features that are common to FISMA,
HIPAA, PCI and ISO and suggested that implementing
the compliance guidelines of FISMA could cover com-
pliance of HIPAA, PCI, and ISO, with the exception of
privacy. The paper also confirms regulation overlaps and
the need for the systematic approaches proposed by [45,
47, 55].
Reference [44] reviewed the EU DPD law and regula-
tions in the context of cloud computing. They pointed
out that parts of the DPD policies are not clear, includ-
ing the definition of sensitive personal data, the roles of
controllers and processors. The authors also mentioned
that there are overlaps among regulations. They used an
enumeration approach to map the DPD policies to avail-
able best practices. They proposed encryption, anonymi-
zation, and pseudonymization to secure personal data in
Table 3 Threats to compliance mapping
Threats Remarks
1 Abuse and Nefarious Use of Cloud Computing - threats related to
abusing cloud network and services by using Denial of Service (DoS),
malicious file upload, and malware
- The authors mapped this threat to ISO 27001 compliance. We believe
that this threat can also be mapped to other regulations
2 Insecure Interfaces and APIs - This is not a threat, it is a vulnerability.
3 Malicious Insiders - Not a threat, a vulnerability. It is not mapped to any regulation
4 Shared Technology Issues - The authors mapped the threat to ISO 27000–27002 and PCI-DSS
compliance. We believe that this threat can also be mapped to other
regulations
5 Data Loss or Leakage - The authors mapped this threat to ISO 17826 and HIPAA compliance.
We believe that this threat can also be mapped to other regulations
6 Account or Service Hijacking - There is no clear mapping between this threat and available
regulations
7 Unknown Risk Profile – it includes transparency, maintenance
responsibility, software version, and fixes
- The mapping between regulations and this threat is not clear.
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the cloud. One of the problems with enumerations is
that they lack a conceptual model of how the require-
ments relate to each other.
Reference [14] proposed a Compliance Request Lan-
guages that can be used to specify compliance patterns
that can be applied to business processes. They built
design-time compliance management framework that
can be used to automate compliance validation and veri-
fication. They made no attempt to define a precise
model for their framework.
Stricker et al. [58] built an RA for service-based systems
using a pattern-based approach. The architecture contains
top-level patterns, abstract patterns, and implementation
patterns. They proposed to include a component catalog
as part of the architecture. However, [58] did not include
a method to map identified components into abstract pat-
terns. Fernandez et al. [22] developed a security reference
architecture (SRA) for cloud systems from use cases,
threat modeling, and patterns; it maps identified compo-
nents into abstract patterns using a catalog. We proposed
a five-step approach to build RAs using metamodels, pat-
terns, and best practices [64]. First, we analyzed RA input
sources from functional requirements, non-functional re-
quirements, stakeholders, regulations and standards. We
identified components from use cases, ontologies, threat
modeling, policies and best practices. Second, we built a
conceptual model (RM) by analyzing domain components,
stakeholders and their interactions. We used UML to
analyze the static and dynamic nature of the identified
components. Third, we mapped the identified compo-
nents to patterns using abstract patterns. Fourth, we built
RAs by combining results from steps 1, 2 and 3. Fifth, we
evaluated the architecture by validating its quality attri-
butes such as accuracy, completeness, modularity, reus-
ability, flexibility, and readability. These architectures, [22,
58, 64], can be used to analyze both functional and non-
functional aspects such as security and compliance at the
architectural level.
In summary, we can conclude that many of the pro-
posed solutions are not approaching compliance chal-
lenges at the architectural level using appropriate models.
All approaches discussed in this section, except [22] and
[64], don’t use a comprehensive metamodel that includes
both functional and non-functional requirements at the




1 Security Management Process: Review permission setting and correct access rights Yes No No
2 Assigned Security Responsibility: Identify the security official who is responsible for the development and implementation of
the policies and procedures.
Yes No No
3 Workforce Security: Ensure that only authorized workforce members have access to Electronic Protected Health Information Yes Yes No
4 Information Access Management: Implement policies and procedures for accessing Electronic Protected Health Information Yes Yes No
5 Access Control: Allow access only to the authorized workforce Yes Yes Yes
6 Audit Control: Record and examine activities for Electronic Protected Health Information Yes Yes Yes
Table 5 Vendor responsibility for PCI DSS Requirement Mapping matrix [12]
PCI requirement Vendor responsibility in
SaaS PaaS IaaS
1 Install and maintain a firewall configuration to protect cardholder data Yes Yes Yes
2 Do not use vendor-supplied defaults for system passwords and other security parameters Yes Yes No
3 Protect stored cardholder data Yes Yes No
4 Encrypt transmission of cardholder data across open, public networks Yes Yes No
5 Use and regularly update anti-virus software Yes Yes No
6 Develop and maintain secure systems and applications Yes No No
7 Restrict access to cardholder data by business need-to-know Yes Yes Yes
8 Assign a unique ID to each person with computer access Yes Yes No
9 Restrict physical access to cardholder data Yes Yes No
10 Track and monitor all access to network resources and cardholder data Yes Yes Yes
11 Regularly test security systems and processes Yes Yes Yes
12 Maintain a policy that addresses information security Yes No No
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architectural level as shown in Table 6. As a result, many
RAs are either incomplete or do not follow standard
models or architectures. In addition, the proposed solu-
tions and architectures can be more understandable and
precise if they used standard models, patterns, and
architectures.
4 Compliance approaches in industry
Most businesses use independent third party certifying
agencies and internal IT auditors to assure compliance, se-
curity, and privacy [15]. The US government published the
list of FedRAMP-certified cloud service providers and
Third Party Assessment Organizations (3PAOs) that can be
used as a reference for cloud service providers and con-
sumers [15, 17]. Reference [15] recommends that con-
sumers review and approve compliance reports and
certificates before signing the service contract. Service pro-
viders are using 3PAOs and internal auditors to certify
compliance. In addition to third party compliance certifica-
tion, many service providers use enumeration to claim their
completeness. The problem with enumerations is that they
do not provide a measure of completeness and lack a con-
ceptual model of how the requirements relate to each other
and to the system.
Service providers such as Amazon, IBM, Microsoft, Or-
acle, HP, Cisco, Hitachi, and others claim compliance for
HIPAA, PCI, FISMA, SOX, and GLBA. References [2, 35,
49] describe RAs for clouds with conceptual and logical
views that include security management and compliance.
Their architectures use models and enumeration to de-
scribe components and their interactions. Amazon Web
Services (AWS) published a list of compliance eligible ser-
vices such as DynamoDB, Elastic Block Store (EBS), Elastic
Cloud Compute (EC2), Glacier, Redshift, Elastic MapRe-
duce (EMR), Simple Storage Service (S3), Identity and Ac-
cess Management (IAM), CloudTrial, CloudHSM, and
Amazon Relational Database (RDS) to protect customers’
data at rest and in motion [1, 3]. Reference [51] published
an RA for PCI-DSS using specific products such as
VMware, Cisco, Trend Micro, and HyTrust; this architec-
ture maps PCI rules to hardware and software products.
Reference [61] describes a compliance Reference Architec-
ture Framework (RAF) to address requirements at the in-
frastructure, application, and end user computing layers.
Infrastructure layer compliance includes network security,
configuration management, log management, and platform
security. Application layer compliance includes permissions
and governance, service level agreement, and data security.
End user computing layer includes identity management,
end point security, authentication, and authorization. Refer-
ence [61] maps regulation policies to corresponding layers
and VMware products. Reference [10] built regulatory
compliant architectures using a risk management frame-
work to address functional capabilities, operational reliabil-
ity, regulatory compliance, and security. The framework
uses a standard enterprise layer architecture (i.e. web layer,
application layer, service layer, business, and data layers) to
identify components, and map compliance policies to cor-
responding Cisco products. References [10, 62] proposed a
compliance reference architecture by abstracting regula-
tions and corporate policies. References [43, 62] use SOX
and Microsoft products to identify components, build the
architecture, and map compliance policies to appropriate
Microsoft products. Reference [34] proposes a compliance
architecture derived from regulation overlaps among cor-
porate governance and regulations. Reference [35] enumer-
ates policies from regulations and maps them to
proprietary identity and access management products.
Compliance in the cloud is a shared responsibility among
service providers and consumers [53]. The responsibility of
service providers and consumers vary based on the type of
their service models. In the case of IaaS, consumers are re-
sponsible to secure services, platforms, and data. Service
providers are responsible to secure the infrastructure. In
the case of PaaS, consumers are responsible to secure ser-
vices and data; service providers are responsible to secure
platforms and infrastructures. In the case of SaaS, con-
sumers are responsible to secure data; service providers are
responsible to secure services, platforms and infrastruc-
tures. In general, the lack of full control and transparency
creates compliance challenges in the cloud.
In summary, most service providers have published
compliance architectures, designs, and implementations
based on their own proprietary cloud platforms, infra-
structures, and products. The available RAs published
by service providers are either vendor specific or do not
follow standard models, patterns or architectures. As a
result, it is very difficult to analyze their level and scope
of compliance. Consumers are also challenged to evalu-
ate service providers without having standard RAs and
models that could be used as a common reference and
checklist.
5 Summary of compliance issues and
recommendations
In this section we summarize five major compliance
issues.
Table 6 Summary of Related Work
Study RAs Patterns Metamodel
[48] Yes No No
[6, 12, 13, 28, 30, 44–47, 54, 55] No No No
[14] No Yes No
[58] No Yes No
[22] Yes Yes Yes
[64] Yes Yes Yes
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5.1 Complexity of regulations
As indicated earlier, regulations are written by lawyers
and often lengthy and hard to read. In some cases, the
rules are redundant, ambiguous, and even inconsistent.
Regulations also vary from country to country. There
have been attempts to make regulations clearer and
more precise by using block diagrams, citation graphs,
and reference models. However, there have been only a
few attempts to make their software architecture more
precise in order to understand and analyze policies at a
higher level and eventually guide design and implemen-
tation efforts. Reference [21] described the major HIPAA
rules as patterns, to make HIPAA clearer and more pre-
cise. These HIPAA regulation patterns include: HIPAA
security rule, HIPAA privacy rule, HIPAA transactions
and code sets rule, HIPAA unique identifiers rule, and
HIPAA enforcement rule. Figure 1 shows a UML class
diagram for the HIPAA security rule [21]. It shows its
major components, entities, and their associations. It in-
cludes Role-Based Access Control Authorization, Au-
thenticator, and Security Logger/Auditor patterns [18].
We need to identify more patterns for regulations to
make regulations clearer and more precise.
5.2 Regulation overlaps
Our survey reveals that there are overlaps among regula-
tions such as HIPAA, PCI, SOX, GLBA and FISMA [23,
30, 45, 46]. Most cloud service providers are required to
support multiple regulations in order to fulfill con-
sumers’ needs. The cost of implementing individual reg-
ulations can lead to high implementation and
maintenance costs, duplication of efforts, and
inconsistencies. Hamdaqa and Hamou-Lhadj [30]; Mir-
ković [45]; Netschert [46] attempted to identify overlap-
ping features such as security, user management,
notification, and reporting. Reference [30] used a cit-
ation graph to identify overlaps. These overlaps could
incur unnecessary cost and maybe inconsistencies. There
has been only one attempt to identify these overlaps at
the architectural level [23].
5.3 Lack of standard Reference Architectures (RAs)
There is no accepted definition about what an RA
should contain; [4] provide ways to describe and evalu-
ate RAs by using IEEE recommended architectural de-
scription practice [38], Rational Unified Process (RUP)
artifacts [40] and UML [5]. Reference [58] built an RA
for service-based systems using patterns. Reference [22]
built an RA for cloud systems with use cases, activity di-
agrams, and patterns. We can observe that there are dif-
ferent levels of understanding and approaches to build
RAs. In addition, the style and the depth of the architec-
tures are different among service providers. On the
other hand, consumers are challenged to evaluate service
providers’ compliance without having a standard check-
list. We can conclude that available approaches don’t
use a comprehensive metamodel that includes both
functional and non-functional requirements. As a result,
many RAs are either incomplete or do not follow stand-
ard models or architectures. We proposed a five-step ap-
proach to build RAs using metamodels, patterns, and
best practices [64] (see Section 3). Figure 2 shows a
UML class diagram of a compliance and security RA
(CSRA) from a SaaS service provider perspective. The
Fig. 1 Class diagram for HIPAA’s security rule [21]
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architecture includes major regulation components,
stakeholders, cloud components, patterns, and best prac-
tices. There are other approaches to build RAs but we
think that this is the first one that takes advantage of
patterns to properly represent regulations.
5.4 Lack of full control and transparency
The lack of full control and transparency is also one of
the compliance challenges in the public cloud [44, 48].
The data stored in the public cloud could be replicated
in different regions and / or countries that could violate
privacy laws of other countries. In addition, service pro-
viders are required to ensure the confidentiality, integ-
rity, availability and accountability (CIAA) of consumers’
data as per the government and industry regulations.
Reference [6] developed a framework that can control
data location while maintaining compliance. Reference
[12] suggested more research to build consumers’ trust
and compliance.
5.5 Security threats
Cloud services like any IT platforms are subjected to a
variety of security threats [31, 50]. The complexity and
shared responsibilities of cloud computing are also an-
other security threat that could affect the overall compli-
ance. Cloud computing is relatively new and still
changing. More research is needed to build consumers’
confidence and trust by identifying potential security
and compliance threats. Reference [22] developed a se-
curity reference architecture to enforce cloud security.
The architecture can be extended to support compliance
by adding compliance patterns and best practices. The
architecture proposed in [64] follows this approach and
can handle identified threats by including appropriate
security patterns as shown in [22].
5.6 Overlap with security
Most of compliance has to do with security. However,
compliance is often handled by different groups who
don’t have a full expertise on security. Looking at some
of the recommendations in the publications we surveyed
we find that many of them are rather naïve and not
enough to provide a highly secure architecture.
6 Conclusions and future directions
We have analyzed the state of the art in complying with
regulations by examining recent publications and sur-
veying industrial approaches. Regulations and standards
are complex, possibly redundant and even inconsistent
in some cases. A good way to handle compliance com-
plexities, uncertainties, and overlaps is by applying
standard models, patterns, architectures, and best prac-
tices. There have been attempts to analyze regulation
policies and overlaps. However, there has been no
attempt to make their software architecture more pre-
cise at a higher level to eventually guide design and im-
plementation efforts. These kinds of standard
approaches could improve compliance, security, privacy
and the overall software quality of cloud systems. We
examined how publications and industry have consid-
ered this particular aspect as a measure of their ability
to cope with an increasing complexity. While there are
other aspects that affect compliance we have taken the
proper use of architectures as a key point.
Our survey reveals that more research is needed to
overcome compliance challenges. Reference [21] de-
scribed the two major HIPAA rules as patterns to make
HIPAA clearer and more precise, but we need to identify
more regulation patterns by analyzing available regula-
tions, standards, and policy based systems. A collection
of patterns can be used to build pattern-based compli-
ance RAs [64]. We need to develop a complete and pre-
cise RA that can be used to analyze complex regulations,
avoid overlaps, mitigate security threats, and promote
the usage of patterns. We proposed a five-step approach
to build RAs using metamodels, patterns, and best prac-
tices [64]. We have built an RA for HIPAA and CSRA
for cloud systems with the proposed five-step approach.
An architecture built out of patterns can be used as a
common language among architects, developers, busi-
ness owners, managers, service providers, and auditors.
It can also be used as a reference to design and imple-
ment automated systems that can be used for testing,
auditing, and compliance verification. We need to build
more RAs in the areas of services, platforms, regulations,
and policy-based systems to improve software quality. It
is very important to convince industry that they need to
adopt more abstract compliance architectures that pro-
vide greater flexibility and adaptability to new and evolv-
ing regulations. We need also to merge the work on
compliance with the work on security and provide a uni-
fied approach that considers both aspects.
Competing interests
We have no competing interests.
Authors’ contributions
D.Yimam found and selected most of the references in the survey sections,
evaluated and classifiedthem. E. B.Fernandez wrote most of the Introduction
and conclusions. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Acknowledgements
We thank the reviewers who provided valuable suggestions that have
significantly improved this work.
Received: 7 October 2015 Accepted: 15 April 2016
References
1. Amazon. Amazon web services: risk and compliance. http://media.
amazonwebservices.com/AWS_Risk_and_Compliance_Whitepaper.pdf.
2. Amazon. AWS compliance. https://d0.awsstatic.com/whitepapers/
compliance/AWS_Risk_and_Compliance_Whitepaper.pdf.
Yimam and Fernandez Journal of Internet Services and Applications  (2016) 7:5 Page 11 of 12
3. Amazon Web Services. Risk and compliance. https://d0.awsstatic.com/
whitepapers/compliance/AWS_Risk_and_Compliance_Whitepaper.pdf.
4. Avgeriou P. Describing, instantiating and evaluating a reference
architecture: a case study. Enterp Archit J. 2003. Available online:http://
www.rug.nl/research/portal/files/14407113/2003EnterpArchitJAvgeriou.pdf.
Accessed 22 Apr 2016.
5. Booch G, Rumbaugh J, Jacobson I. The unified modeling language user guide.
2nd ed: Addison-Wesley; 2005.
6. Brandic I, Dustdar S, Anstett T, Schuman D, Leymann F, Konrad R. Compliant
Cloud Computing (C3): architecture and language support for user-driven
compliance management in clouds, Proceeding CLOUD ‘10 Proceedings of the
2010 IEEE 3rd International Conference on Cloud Computing. Miami, Florida,
USA: 2010; 244–51.
7. Breaux TD, Anton AI. Analyzing regulatory rules for privacy and security
requirements. IEEE Trans Soft Eng. 2008;34:5–20.
8. Buschmann F, Meunier R, Rohnert H, Sommerlad P, Stal M. Pattern-Oriented
Software Architecture: A System of Patterns, vol. 1.Wiley; 1996
9. Cisco. Cisco compliance solutions. http://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en/us/
solutions/collateral/enterprise-networks/pci-compliance/pci-dss-30-wp.pdf.
Accessed 22 Apr 2016.
10. Cisco. The risk management framework: building a secure and regulatory
compliant trading architecture. http://www.cisco.com/web/strategy/docs/
finance/risk_mgmt_C11-521656_wp.pdf.
11. COBIT. IT Governance Framework - Information Assurance Control, ISACA.
http://www.isaca.org/Knowledge-Center/cobit/Pages/Overview.aspx.
12. Dasgupta D, Naseem D. Security and compliance testing strategies for
cloud computing. https://umdrive.memphis.edu/g-mis/www/memphis/
step/STEP2012/STEP2012Proceedings3.pdf.
13. Dasgupta D, Naseem D. A framework for estimating security coverage for
cloud service insurance, Proceedings 7th Cyber-Security and Information
Intelligence Reserach Workshop, Oak Ridge, TN, October 12-14, 2011.
14. Elgammal A, Turekten O, van der Heuvel W-J, Papazoglou M. Formalizing
and applying compliance patterns for business process compliance. J Softw
Syst Model. 2016;15:119–46. doi:10.1007/s10270-014-0395-3.
15. FedRAMP. FedRAMP compliant cloud systems. https://www.fedramp.gov/
resources/documents/.
16. FedRAMP. Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP).
https://www.fedramp.gov/resources/documents/.
17. FedRAMP. FedRAMP Third Party Assessment Organizations (3PAOs). https://
www.fedramp.gov/resources/documents/.
18. Fernandez EB. Security patterns in practice: building secure architectures
using software patterns, Wiley Series on Software Design Patterns. 2013.
19. Fernandez EB, Yuan X. Semantic analysis patterns, Proceedings of the 19th
Int. Conf. on Conceptual Modeling, ER2000. p. 183–95.
20. Fernandez EB, Larrondo-Petrie MM, Sorgente T, Van Hilst M. A methodology
to develop secure systems using patterns. In: Mouratidis H, Giorgini P,
editors. Integrating security and software engineering: advances and future
vision. IDEA Press; 2006. p. 107–26.
21. Fernandez EB, Mujica S. Two patterns for HIPAA regulations, Procs. of
AsianPLoP (Pattern Languages of Programs) 2014. Tokyo: 2014.
22. Fernandez EB, Monge R, Hashizume K. Building a security reference architecture
for cloud systems. Requir Eng. 2015; doi:10.1007/s00766-014-0218-7.
23. Fernandez EB, Yimam D. Towards compliant reference architectures by finding
analogies and overlaps in compliance regulations, Procs.12th Int. Conf. on
Security and Cryptography (SECRYPT 2015), Colmar, France, July 2015.
24. FISMA. Federal Information Security Management Act FISMA. http://www.
healthinfolaw.org/federal-law/federal-information-security-management-act-fisma.
25. Fowler M. Analysis patterns – reusable object models. Addison-Wesley; 1997.
26. Gamma E, Helm R, Johnson R, Vlissides J. Design patterns: elements of
reusable object-oriented software. Boston: Addison-Wesley; 1994.
27. Gartner. http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2352816.
28. Gikas C. A General Comparison of FISMA, HIPAA, ISO 27000 and PCI-DSS
Standards. Inf Secur J. 2010;19(3):132–41.
29. GLBA. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. http://www.business.ftc.gov/privacy-and-
security/gramm-leach-bliley-act.
30. Hamdaqa M, Hamou-Lhadj A. Citation analysis: an approach for facilitating
the analysis of regulatory compliance documents, Procs. 2009 6th Int. Conf.
on Information technology: New Generations. IEEE; 2009. p. 278–83.
31. Hashizume K, Rosado DG, Fernández-Medina E, Fernandez EB. An analysis of
security issues for cloud computing. J Internet Serv Appl. 2013;4:5. 27
February 2013.
32. HIPAA. HIPAA Administrative Simplification. https://www.fedramp.gov/
resources/documents/.
33. HIPAA. Understanding Health Information Privacy. http://www.hhs.gov/sites/
default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/consumers/understanding-
hipaa-notice.pdf.
34. Hitachi. Compliance architecture. http://hitachi-id.com/compliance/
compliance-architecture.html.
35. IBM. IBM Cloud computing. http://www.ibm.com/cloud-computing/.
36. IBM. Security compliance services. http://www-935.ibm.com/services/us/en/
it-services/security-services/compliance-and-regulatory-services/.
37. IDC. International Data Corporation. http://www.idc.com/prodserv/
subservices.jsp.
38. IEEE. IEEE 1471–2000 recommended practice for architectural description of
software-intensive systems. 2000. https://standards.ieee.org/findstds/
standard/1471-2000.html.
39. ISO. ISO Information Security Standard. Available: http://www.
iso27001security.com/.
40. Kruchten P. The rational unified process, an introduction. 3rd ed. Addison-
Wesley; 2003.
41. Massey AK, Smith B, Otto PN, Anton AI. Assessing the accuracy of legal
implementation readiness decisions, 19th IEEE Int. Reqs. Eng. Conf. 2011. p.
207–16.
42. Mather T, Kumaraswamy S, Latif S. Cloud security and privacy: an enterprise
perspective on risks and compliance. O’Relly Media; 2009.
43. Microsoft Azure. Microsoft Azure Trust Center. http://azure.microsoft.com/
en-us/support/trust-center/compliance/.
44. Millard C. Cloud computing law. Oxford University Press; 2013
45. Mirković O. Security - How to measure compliance, MIPRO proceedings.
2008.
46. Netschert BM. Information security readiness and compliance in the
healthcare industry. Stevens Institute of Technology; 2008
47. Ngugi B, Vega G, Dardick G. PCI compliance: overcoming the challenges.
Journal of information security and privacy. Int J Inf Secur Priv. 2009;3:2.
48. NIST. Guidelines on security and privacy in public cloud computing. http://
nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-144.pdf.
Accessed on April 22, 2016.
49. Oracle. Cloud reference architecture. http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/
Legacy/SP/nistspecialpublication800-144.pdf. Accessed April 22, 2016.
50. OWASP. Cloud-10 regulatory compliance. https://www.owasp.org/index.
php/Cloud-10_Regulatory_Compliance.
51. PCI-DSS RA. PCI-compliant cloud reference architecture. http://www.hytrust.
com/solutions/compliance/.
52. PCI DSS standard. Official source of PCI DSS Data Security Standards. https://
www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/index.php.
53. PCI guidelines. PCI cloud guidelines. https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/
documents/PCI_DSS_V3.0_Third_Party_Security_Assurance.pdf.
54. Ruiter J, Warnier M. Computers, privacy and data protection: an element of
choice. 2011. p. 361–76.
55. Silva CMR, Silva JLC, Rodrigues RB, Nascimento LM, Garcia VC. Systematic
mapping study on security threats in cloud computing. IJCSIS. 2013;11:3.
56. Sony. Sony freezes 93,000 online accounts after security breach. http://
www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2011/10/12/sony-freezes-93000-online-
accounts-after-security-breach/.
57. SOX law. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act. http://www.soxlaw.com/.
58. Stricker V, Lauenroth K, Corte P, Gittler F, De Panfilis S, Pohl K. Creating a
reference architecture for service-based systems a pattern-based approach.
2010; doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-539-6-149. IOS Press.
59. Target. Response & resources related to Target’s data breach. https://
corporate.target.com/about/payment-card-issue.aspx.
60. Taylor RN, Medvidovic N, Dashofy N. Software architecture: foundation,
theory, and practice. Wiley; 2010.
61. VMware. Compliance reference architecture framework. https://
solutionexchange.vmware.com/store/products/vmware-compliance-cyber-
risk-solutions.
62. Walker M. Architecting regulatory-compliant architectures. https://msdn.
microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb233047.aspx.
63. Warmer J, Kleppe A. The object constraint language. 2nd ed. Addison-
Wesley; 2003.
64. Yimam D, Fernandez EB. Building Compliance and Security Reference
Architectures (CSRA) for cloud systems, IEEE International Conference on
Cloud Engineering (IC2E). 2016.
Yimam and Fernandez Journal of Internet Services and Applications  (2016) 7:5 Page 12 of 12
